

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00

PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01

PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 ACDA-19 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04

SAM-01 OMB-01 AEC-11 DRC-01 /137 W

----- 042396

R 151425Z JUN 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6388

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO ALL NATO CAPITLS 4155

USCINCEUR VAIHIGEN

USNMR SHAPE

USLO SACLANT

CINCLANT

AMEMBASSY MADRID

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 3433

E.O. 11652: GDS 12-31-82

TAGS: PFOR, NATO

SUBJECT: DPC MINISTERIAL MEETING JUNE 14, 1974:

TEXT OF SECDEF'S STATEMENT

FOR THE RECORD ON STRATEGIC FORCES AND DOCTRINE

OTTAWA HOLD FOR SECSTATE PARTY AT NATOMIN

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SECRETARY SCHLESINGER'S STATEMENT ON STRATEGIC FORCES AND DOCTRINE WHICH WAS PRESENTED FOR THE RECORD BY SECDEF REP (ELLSWORTH) AT JUNE 14 DPC MINISTERIAL MEETING AT NATO. TEXT WAS DISTRIBUTED TO SYG, DPC DELEGATIONS AND CHAIRMAN, MC ON JUNE 14.

BEGIN TEXT

SINCE OUR LAST MEETING, SEVERAL ISSUES HAVE ARISEN WHICH
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I THOUGHT I SHOULD DISCUSS WITH YOU TODAY. THEY CONCERN THREE
MATTERS:

-- OUR STRATEGIC PROGRAM INITIATIVES AND THEIR NEED;

-- STRATEGIC NUCLEAR OPTIONS AND THE DESIRABILITY OF
HAVING PLANNING FLEXIBILITY;

-- THE IMPACT OF THESE MEASURES ON DETERRENCE AND THE
PROBABILITY OF NUCLEAR WAR.

I. THE BASIS FOR OUR STRATEGIC PROGRAM INITIATIVES

AS YOU KNOW, THE NEGOTIATIONS AT SALT HAVE ESTABLISHED THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY SHOULD GOVERN IN THE FUTURE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE US AND SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES. WE HAVE ALSO AGREED THAT NEITHER SIDE WOULD SEEK STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE OVER THE OTHER. ACCORDINGLY, THE FUTURE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF US STRATEGIC FORCES WILL DEPEND VERY CRITICALLY ON DECISIONS BY THE USSR AND THE OUTCOME OF THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS.

WHAT DO WE MEAN BY EQUALITY IN THE REALM OF THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES? AS THE US SEES IT, EQUALITY NEED NOT MEAN PRECISE SYMMETRY BETWEEN THE CAPABILITIES OF THE TWO SIDES; RATHER, WE WOULD PREFER TO THINK OF EQUALITY IN TERMS OF ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE AND MORE THAT EQUIVALENCE BY MEANS OF THROW-WEIGHT AND RE-ENTRY VEHICLES.

AS I HAVE INDICATED ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS, WE WOULD PREFER TO ACHIEVE AND STABILIZE ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE AT LOWER FORCE LEVELS THAN THE TWO PARTIES NOW HAVE. IF THAT IS NOT AGREEABLE TO THE USSR, WE CAN ACCEPT THE BALANCE AS IT NOW STANDS. BUT IF THE SOVIETS CONTINUE WITH THEIR PRESENT PROGRAMS, WE WILL MATCH THEM BOTH IN FORCES AND IN THE CAPABILITIES OF THESE FORCES. THERE SHOULD BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING WHATSOEVER ON THAT SCORE.

IT IS THIS DETERMINATION WHICH HAS LED TO THE VARIOUS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS THAT WE HAVE REQUESTED FROM THE CONGRESS AND THAT ARE CURRENTLY UNDER DEBATE. AS YOU WILL NO DOUBT AGREE, THESE PROGRAMS REPRESENT A MINIMUM OF PRUDENT INSURANCE AGAINST CONTINUED
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MOMENTUM IN THE SOVIET STRATEGIC INITIATIVES. AS LONG AS THE SOVIETS DRIVE AHEAD WITH ADVANCED ICBM AND OTHER OFFENSIVE PROGRAMS, WE SHALL MAKE COUNTERVAILING EFFORTS. IF THEY STOP, SO WILL WE.

I DO NOT WANT TO PRETEND THAT THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY AND ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE ARE THE ONLY BASES FOR OUR FORCE PROGRAMS. PERCEPTIONS ABOUT THE STRATEGIC FORCES ARE ALSO IMPORTANT -- IN FACT, AS IMPORTANT AS THE PHYSICAL CAPABILITIES THEMSELVES. WE DO NOT PROPOSE TO TOLERATE ILLUSIONS OF SUPERIORITY OR ATTEMPTS AT NUCLEAR COERCION -- WHETHER AGAINST THE UNITED STATES OR AGAINST ITS ALLIES -- BY ANY PARTY. NOR WILL WE ALLOW THE SOVIETS TO ACQUIRE OPTIONS FOR ACTION THAT WE DO NOT HAVE. IN OTHER WORDS, EQUALITY AND ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE MUST NOT ONLY EXIST IN FACT; ALL INTERESTED

PARTIES MUST ALSO PERCEIVE THAT THEY EXIST AND WILL BE MAINTAINED.

II. THE BASIS FOR OUR STRATEGIC OPTIONS

IF OUR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS CONTINUE, THEY WILL GIVE US IMPROVED SECOND-STRIKE CAPABILITIES, LARGER THROW-WEIGHTS AND HIGHER ACCURACIES AND YIELDS. CARRIED TO COMPLETION, THEY WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE REFINEMENT OF OUR CONTINGENCY PLANS (OR OPTIONS, IF YOU WILL), BUT THEY ARE NOT ESSENTIAL TO SUCH A REFINEMENT. AS I HAVE REPEATEDLY STRESSED, WE ARE DEVELOPING -- AND WILL CONTINUE TO DEVELOP -- STRATEGIC OPTIONS INDEPENDENTLY OF THE R&D PROGRAMS THAT WE HAVE PROPOSED.

THE BASIS FOR MORE REFINED AND DIVERSIFIED CONTINGENCY PLANNING IS QUITE SIMPLE. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE LONG CONSIDERED THE RESPONSE OF MASSIVE RETALIATION (OR ABSURD DESTRUCTION) A NECESSARY BUT NOT SUFFICIENT FOUNDATION FOR DETERRENCE. PLANS FOR LARGE-SCALE ATTACKS ON MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND OTHER TARGETS OF VALUE -- PLANS WHICH WE HAVE HAD FOR SOME TIME -- ARE ALSO NECESSARY. BUT THEY, TOO, ARE INADEQUATE TO THE MANY NUCLEAR CONTINGENCIES THAT COULD NOW ARISE.

IN AN ERA OF NUCLEAR PLENTY AND WELL-PROTECTED, SECOND-STRIKE STRATEGIC FORCES, WE MUST CONSIDER AND BE ABLE TO DETER OTHER TYPES OF NUCLEAR ATTACKS AS WELL. WHATEVER THE PRECISE OBJECTIVES OF THE SOVIETS, THEY ARE BEGINNING TO ACQUIRE THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES IN THE PAST. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, NOT ONLY MUST WE BE ABLE TO COUNTER THIS GRADUALLY INCREASING FLEXIBILITY BY APPROPRIATE AND CREDIBLE MEANS; WE MUST ALSO MAKE THAT PROSPECT QUITE CLEAR TO THE
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KREMLIN. IN SO DOING, WE STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE.

THESE MORE REFINED CONTINGENCY PLANS ARE PARTICULARLY RELEVANT TO THE MEMBERS OF NATO. ALTHOUGH THE RHETORIC OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ANALYSIS PLACES PRIMARY EMPHASIS ON SURPRISE ATTACK AND THE ABILITY TO COUNTER SUCH AN ATTACK, THE BOLT OUT OF THE BLUE IS NOT WHAT SHOULD CONCERN US EXCLUSIVELY NOW THAT WE DEPLOY HIGHLY SURVIVABLE RETALIATORY FORCES. THE MORE LIKELY CONTINGENCIES (TO THE EXTENT THAT ANYTHING IS LIKELY IN THIS ESOTERIC REALM) WOULD ARISE OUT OF AN INCREASINGLY TENSE DIPLOMATIC CONFRONTATION OR A MILITARY CONFLICT IN ONE OF THE NATO REGIONS. INDEED, CONSIDERING THE MAGNITUDE OF THE SOVIET NUCLEAR THREAT TO WESTERN EUROPE, NATO IS THE MOST PROBABLE TARGET OF SUCH COERCIVE TACTICS AND POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTIONS.

IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES THERE ARE MANY TARGETS WHICH WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO ATTACK. CONDITIONS MIGHT WARRANT A STRIKE AGAINST SELECTED SOVIET MRBM, IRBM, AND MEDIUM BOMBER BASES. ALTERNATIVELY, WE MIGHT FIND IT APPROPRIATE TO EMBARK ON AN INTERDICTION CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN EUROPE SO AS TO FRUSTRATE ANY SUSTAINED ATTACK ON THE ALLIANCE. THE CHOICE AMONG THE CONTINGENCY PLANS WOULD NECESSARILY DEPEND ON OUR ESTIMATES OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES.

THE MAIN POINT, HOWEVER, IS THAT A WIDER RANGE OF STRATEGIC
OPTIONS AND IMPROVED CONTINGENCY PLANS WILL PUT US IN A MUCH BETTER
POSITION THAN PREVIOUSLY TO MAKE ANY WARLIKE ACTIONS LOOK ENORMOUSLY
UNATTRACTIVE TO THE SOVIETS. AT THE SAME TIME, THESE OPTIONS SHOULD
HELP TO CLARIFY THE MINDS OF LEADERS IN OTHER PACT COUNTRIES AND EN-
COURAGE THEM TO DISSUADE THE KREMLIN FROM EXORBITANTLY RECKLESS ACTS.

FOR ALL THESE REASONS, WE SHALL CONTINUE TO DEVELOP AND REFINES
OUR STRATEGIC OPTIONS. AS WE GO ALONG, WE HOPE TO HAVE YOUR COOPERA-
TION AND SUPPORT IN THIS PLANNING ENTERPRISE, ESPECIALLY SINCE IT
SHOULD EXTEND TO THE THEATER-BASED AS WELL AS THE STRATEGIC UNCLEAR
FORCES.

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R 151425Z JUN 74

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AT THE PRESENT TIME, WE ARE WORKING ON FOUR TYPES OF EMPLOYMENT
OPTIONS. IN GENERAL, THEIR CONTENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS.

FIRST, WE HAVE THE MAJOR ATTACK OPTIONS WHICH ARE GENERALLY
SIMILAR TO THE OLD TASKS THAT WE PROGRAMMED FOR GENERAL NUCLEAR WAR.
THEY INCLUDE STRIKE OPTIONS AGAINST BOTH MILITARY AND URBAN-INDUSTRIA
L
TARGETS. THEY ALSO CONTAIN WHAT WE CALL "OPTIONAL WITHHOLDS" WHICH
PERMIT US TO DROP OR ADD INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES IN THE TARGET LIST,
DEPENDING ON THE EXACT SITUATION THAT CONFRONTS US.

SECOND, WE ARE ALSO RETAINING MORE MODERATE SUBSETS OF THE LARGER OPTIONS SO THAT WE HAVE THE FLEXIBILITY TO ATTACK MILITARY TARGETS ONLY. THESE SUBSETS ARE DESIGNED TO PROVIDE AN ADDITIONAL

MEASURE OF CHOICE TO OUR DECISION-MAKERS AND CONTRIBUTE TO THE
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CONTROL OF ESCALATION AS WELL. MORE OF THESE SUBSETS ARE BEING ADDED TO THE CONTINGENCY PLANS THAT WE ALREADY HAVE.

THIRD, WE ARE DEVELOPING OPTIONS OF STILL SMALLER SCALE AND LESSER INTENSITY. SOME OF THESE OPTIONS WILL BE PREPLANNED; OTHERS WILL HAVE TO BE DESIGNED IN RESPONSE TO A PARTICULAR EMERGENCY. MOST WILL CONCENTRATE ON FIXED TARGETS OF VARIOUS KINDS AND WILL USE EITHER STRATEGIC OR THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES, OR (MORE PROBABLY) SOME COMBINATION OF THE TWO. THE OBJECTIVES OF SUCH PLANS WILL BE QUITE LIMITED; FOR EXAMPLE, THEY MAY SIMPLY ENTAIL RESPONDING IN KIND TO A LIMITED NUCLEAR ATTACK.

THE FINAL CLASS OF OPTIONS WOULD PROVIDE FOR A LIMITED RESPONSE TO AN ENEMY ATTACK WITH FORCES FROM THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS, INCLUDING THOSE AT SEA. CURRENTLY OUR OPTIONS ARE LIMITED TO THE APPLICATION OF THE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES IN RESPONSE TO REQUESTS FROM THE MNC'S ARISING AFTER A CONFLICT HAS STARTED, OR TO THE EXECUTION OF THEATER-WIDE PREPLANNED ATTACKS SUCH AS ARE CONTAINED IN THE NATO GENERAL STRIKE PLAN. THE TIME HAS CLEARLY COME TO MOVE FROM OUR CURRENT GENERAL GUIDELINES TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONCRETE CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR THE USE OF OUR NUCLEAR FORCES ON LAND AND AT SEA. I COMMEND SACEUR FOR THIS WORK IN DEVELOPING SELECTIVE EMPLOYMENTS PLANS CONSISTENT WITH THE DOCTRINE I HAVE DESCRIBED. THIS WORK BY NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES AND THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE NPG SHOULD CONTINUE.

III. DETERRENCE AND THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD

AS I HAVE ALREADY INDICATED, WE HAVE BEEN LIVING WITH A LIMITED NUMBER OF STRATEGIC OPTIONS FOR MANY YEARS, AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE LIKELIHOOD OF NUCLEAR WAR HAS INCREASED AS A CONSEQUENCE. THIS REALIZATION HAS LED TO THE COLLAPSE OF THE CHIEF OPPOSITION TO GREATER FLEXIBILITY, AT LEAST IN THE UNITED STATES. LIKE MOLIERE'S BOURGEOIS GENTILHOMME, THE CRITICS DISCOVERED THAT THEY HAD, IN A SENSE, BEEN SPEAKING FRENCH ALL ALONG, AND THAT OPTIONS HAD BEEN NO MORE PROVOCATIVE OR DESTABILIZING THAN THE DOGMA OF MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION.

BUT DOGMAS DIE HARD, AND CONCERNS CONTINUE TO PERSIST ABOUT THE WISDOM OF IMPROVING OUR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS IN GENERAL, AND THEIR ACCURACY IN PARTICULAR. A FREQUENTLY ARTICULATED FEAR
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IS THAT, PARTICULARLY IF WE EXPAND OUR CAPABILITY TO DESTROY HARD TARGETS, ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO PREEMPT IN A CRISIS IN ORDER TO SAVE ITS OWN ICBM FORCE FROM DESTRUCTION. ANOTHER CONCERN IS THAT AS NUCLEAR OPTIONS BECOME MORE REFINED, NUCLEAR WAR MIGHT BEGIN TO LOOK MORE ATTRACTIVE, WITH A RESULTING DECREASE IN THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD. FINALLY, THE FEAR HAS BEEN EXPRESSED THAT NEW STRATEGIC OPTIONS JOINED WITH OUR R&D PROGRAMS COULD STIMULATE AND ACCELERATE THE ARMS COMPETITION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION DESPITE OUR MUTUAL EFFORTS AT DETENTE.

IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT THERE SHOULD BE CONCERN ABOUT ANY ACTIONS THAT MIGHT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF NUCLEAR WAR. BUT FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS, I DO NOT THINK THAT IS WHAT IS AT ISSUE HERE.

BOTH SIDES NOW HAVE SUFFICIENTLY SECURE COMPONENTS OF THEIR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES SO THAT FIRST-STRIKE DISARMING ATTACKS HAVE SIMPLY BECOME IMPOSSIBLE FOR AS FAR AHEAD AS WE CAN FORESEE. AS A CONSEQUENCE, A PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE WILL LOOK LIKE A VERY STARK AND DESPERATE CHOICE INDEED. EVEN LIMITED NUCLEAR STRIKES -- HOWEVER SELECTIVE AND DISCRIMINATING -- RUN THE RISK OF TRIGGERING A RAPID ESCALATION TO UNPRECEDENTED LEVELS OF DESTRUCTION, SO THAT NO NUCLEAR EXCHANGE CAN BE CONVERTED INTO A TEMPTING PROSPECT. IN OUR OWN CASE, MOREOVER, THE OPTIONS WE ARE DEVELOPING ARE DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO THWART ATTACKS AND DENY AN ENEMY HIS OBJECTIVES RATHER THAN INITIATE ANY SUCH ATTACKS OF OUR OWN. MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL, REGARDLESS OF THE NECESSARY PRECAUTIONS WE TAKE IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD, WE WILL CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE AND STRENGTHEN THE GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES OF THE ALLIANCE, INCLUDING THEIR THEATER NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES. NOT ONLY ARE THEY OUR FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE; THEY ARE ALSO THE MOST POWERFUL INSTRUMENT FOR KEEPING THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD HIGH.

AS FAR AS THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE IS CONCERNED, I WOULD MAKE FOUR POINTS FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION. FIRST, THE UNITED STATES HAS EXERCISED SUCH RESTRAINT IN THE BUILDUP OF ITS STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES THAT THE SOVIETS NOW SURPASS US BY A CONSIDERABLE MARGIN IN NUMBERS AND THROW-WEIGHT OF LONG-RANGE MISSILES. ONLY IN BOMBERS AND NUMBERS OF WARHEADS DO WE RETAIN AN ADVANTAGE. SECOND, IT IS NOW THE SOVIETS WHO HAVE THE INITIATIVE IN THE STRATEGIC COMPETITION.

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ALTHOUGH OUR TECHNOLOGY REMAINS SUPERIOR TO THEIRS, IN MOST RESPECTS WE ARE NOW THE FOLLOWERS RATHER THAN THE LEADERS IN THIS STRANGE AND SLUGGISH RACE. THIRD, WE ACTIVELY SEEK TO HALT THE COMPETITION AND ARE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE EQUITABLE LIMITATIONS AND REDUCTIONS IN THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES. FOURTH, THE CHOICE OF A CONTINUED ARMS RACE IS NOT UNDER OUR SOLE CONTROL. IT IS UP TO THE SOVIETS AS WELL AS THE UNITED STATES.

THE RECORD, I THUST, IS CLEAR. NO ONE CAN DOUBT THAT WE SEEK

AN OUTCOME AT SALT THAT IS BENEFICIAL TO ALL NATIONS. BY THE SAME
TOKEN, NO ONE SHOULD DOUBT THAT, WHATEVER THE COUTCOME OF SALT, WE
REMAIN FIRMLY WEDED TO THE DETERRENCE OF BOTH NON-NUCLEAR AND
NUCLEAR ATTACKS ON NATO. THAT HAS BEEN OUR POLICY FOR TWENTY-FIVE
YEARS, AND RECENT VOTES IN THE CONGRESS HAVE CONFIRMED ITS VALIDITY.
THAT, I SHOULD SAY IN CONCLUSION, IS WHAT OUR STRATEGIC OPTIONS
ARE ALL ABOUT.

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 11 JUN 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 15 JUN 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974ATO03433
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS 12-31-82
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740687/abbryvrv.tel
Line Count: 336
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 20 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <20 MAR 2002 by kelleyw0>; APPROVED <08 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: DPC MINISTERIAL MEETING JUNE 14, 1974: TEXT OF SECDEF'S STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD ON STRATEGIC FORCES AND DOCTRINE
TAGS: PFOR, NATO
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO ALL NATO CAPITLS
USCINCEUR VAIHIGEN
USNMR SHAPE
SACLANT
CINCLANT

MADRID
MBFR VIENNA

Type: TE

Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005